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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
oooOooo 
MICHAEL C.W. HESS, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. ( 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau Chief, ( 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, ( 
Respondents and Appellees. ( 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20010621-CA 
010700131 AA 
Priority No. 15 
Michael Hess appeals the trial court's decision to affirm the suspension of his 
driver's license. The issue presented on this appeal deal with the de novo trial only as 
to the service and the commencement of the division's action (as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(3)-(6)) as contemplated by the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, 63-46b-l et seq. The trial court's erroneous conclusion and application of Utah 
Law was plain error of which this court should review de novo. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j) 
(1953, as amended) (appeals transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court). Mr. Hess appeals the final order and judgment of the Second District Court, in 
and for Davis County involving the judicial review of an informal administrative 
hearing. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Whether the trial erroneously declared the commencement of a driver 
license division action is exempted as an emergency proceeding pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-20. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) The commencement of a driver license action is commenced by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3; not § 63-46b-20. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no 
deference to the trial court's interpretation. Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 
757, 759 (Utah 1990). See also Chris & Dick's Lumber v. State Tax Comm'n. 
791 P.2d 511, 513-14 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of statute or rule is generally 
accorded no deference on appeal). 
Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); also Hercules. Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 877 P.2d 133 (Utah 1994). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
2 
[Included in Appendix. (App. 1-8)] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 (2001) Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-20 (2001) 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2001) Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (2001) 
Utah Adm. Code R708-14-6 
STATEMENTS OF FACT FOR THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal from a de novo appeal of the Second Judicial District 
Court affirming the driver's license division suspending Mr. Hess's driving privilege. 
Mr. H e s s was deprived of the statutory right to a proceeding commenced under 
Section 63-46b-3 (neither the State issued a notice of agency action, nor did Mr. Hess 
request for an action by the division). Meanwhile, the facts underlying the arrest for 
Driving Under the Influence were stipulated between the parties. (App. 14)1 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
The parties conducted a de novo trial on May 8, 2001 ? During the trial 
1
 Mr. Hess is required to reference to an appendix form of record. The trial court 
refused to allow Mr. Oliver to check out the record for the purpose of the appeal. (See trial 
court docket-Appendix 11). He has elected to brief with this form of reference to the record 
to avoid destroying his reputation with the trial judge that seeking an order compelling the 
release would have caused if counsel pursued the matter before this court. 
2
 A complete transcript of the de novo trial is included in the record and is cited as 
(App. 12-30). 
3 
the court heard arguments relevant to the commencement of the division's action alone. 
The parties stipulated to the facts of the underlying arrest. (App. 14) and the parties 
stipulated to the service of the DUI Summons and Citation. (App. 31). The citation is 
issued by the arresting officer; not a presiding officer. (App. 31). 
During the de novo trial, Mr. Oliver argued that the driver license action was 
wrongfully commenced. (App. 17-20). He argued that in order to comply with the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the "UAPA"), the division would 
have to comply with Section 63-46b-3 to be commenced properly (App. 6). The judge 
took the time to review the UAPA and then argued with counsel that the 
commencement was pursuant to Section 63-46b-20 (concerning emergency 
proceedings). (App. 20-24). The trial court's arguments were clearly erroneous, (app. 
20), but since he's the judge Mr. Oliver's arguments fell on deaf ears. Thus, this 
appeal. The court took the matter under advisement then later issued it's decision by 
memorandum decision. (See App. 32-36). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court affirmed the division's action against Mr. Hess. The 
license was to remain suspended pursuant to the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law 
And Order. (App. 32-36). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (1953, as amended) and Utah 
4 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (1953, as amended), Utah Law requires the arresting officer to 
provide personal service upon a person suspected of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, and it mandates that division to follow Title 63, Chapter 46b of the UAPA. 
These provisions are in conflict with each other. The Utah Administrative Code, 
pursuant to R708-14-6 clarifies that the division must follow Section 63-46b-3 when 
commencing its action. The person service by the officer under Section 53-3-223 does 
not accomplish the requirements of Section 63-46b-3. This question was presented to 
the trial judge, and the court avoided the decision by claiming an exemption under 
Section 63-46b-20. This error by the court was clearly erroneous pursuant to R70-8-
14-6. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT, 
THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED ERRONEOUSLY THAT A DRIVERS 
LICENSE ACTION IS COMMENCED UNDER SECTION 63-46b-20 RATHER 
THAN AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 63-46b-3 AS REQUIRED BY LAW, 
A. Introduction, 
The U.S. Constitution expressly provides, in pertinent part, "No person 
shall be held to answer . . . nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const, amend. V. Moreover "[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; not shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
5 
protection of the laws." [7.5. Const, amend. XIV § 1. 
The Utah State Constitution expressly provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 
7. And "no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." Utah 
Const, art. I, § 11. Finally, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1983), articulated the standards regarding due process, stating, inter alia: 
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands 
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Rupp v. 
Grantsville City. Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980). 
Id. In this case, it is quite clear that by denying Mr. Hess's rights were affected by the 
division and affirmed by the trial judge as it pertained to his right to locomotion (his 
driver's license privilege). 
B. The Deprivation of Right Outside Of Due Process. 
In this matter, Mr. Hess contends that he was deprived of his driving 
privilege outside of the due course of law. In the State of Utah, the Legislature has 
established the means in which due process rights of drivers are to be administered 
when the division desired to suspend, revoke, cancel, or disqualify (hereinafter, 
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"suspend" only) for suspicion of driving under the influence. These procedures were 
outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.1; 53-3-223; 63-46b-3; and R708-14-6 of the 
Utah Administrative Code. 
In this matter, the division failed to follow these provisions as they clearly 
read. When the division desires to suspend a driver's license, the division must either 
act on the request of the intended party or upon notice by the division. Pursuant to 
Section 63-46-3, proper notice is accomplished by including, inter alia: 
(A). The Notice must be signed by a presiding officer. 
(B). The Names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being 
given by the presiding officer, including the driver. 
(C). The agency's "file number", the file number for the Division is not the 
Citation Number. It is the D.L. number however, the Notice does provide 
clear understanding. 
(D). The name of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(E). A statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted 
informally according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections 
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the provisions of 
Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-l 1. 
(F). If the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each 
respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the mailing date 
of the notice of agency action. 
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(G). If the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal or if a hearing is required b> 
statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled hearing, 
a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and a 
statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may-
be held in default. 
(H). A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained. 
(I). The name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding 
officer. 
In this matter, the DUI Summons and Citation fails to provide any of these requirements. 
(App. 31). The citation is signed by the arresting officer, not a presiding officer. The 
notice fails to include the names and addresses of witnesses and other parties to be 
included in the notice. In order to comply with the UAPA, the division should just 
automatically set a hearing and provide the accused with notice of the action and of any 
hearings. Instead, the Summons requires a party to request a hearing. Why should the 
accused request a hearing? It is not his desire to commence an action against his own 
civil liberties. If it is the division which desires to suspend, the division must comply 
with Section 63-46b-3 as required by R708-14-6. In this matter, the division failed to do 
so, rather the division summarily took action against Mr. Hess, without the benefit of a 
hearing, as required by the UAPA-the sustantive authority which empowers the division 
to exercise the power to suspend. 
8 
As a result of the deficiency, and in view of the substantial policy error the 
division exercises against the citizens and guests of the State of Utah, Mr. Hess appealed 
the decision to the Second District Court. The trial judge in the Second District Court, 
erroneous applied the law during the May 18, 2001 trial de novo. Instead of following the 
law pursuant to Section 63-46b-3 and R708-14-6, the court elected to argue with Mr. 
Hess that Section 63-46b-20 applied. The judge's philosophy was that the division's 
policy must have that the circumstances call for the matter to be treated as an emergency. 
The judges decision should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this matter, the trial court condoned the division's deprivation of Mr. 
Hess's right to operate a motor vehicle. The trial court condoned the division's action 
contrary to the established substantive due process as provided by the law. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and its September 5, 2001 order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of 
April, 2002. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to: Rebecca D. Waldron, State Agency 
Counsel Division, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 140857, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0857. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2002. 
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APPENDICES 
which a license was. pre\iousl> suspended under Section 
53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this 
section, a court may order the operator's license of a 
person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to 
be suspended or revoked for an additional penod of 90 
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways 
those persons who have shown they are safety hazards 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license 
under this Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and 
send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or 
revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate m home 
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring, the 
electronic monitonng shall alert the appropriate correc-
tions, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement 
units, or contract provider of the defendant's where-
abouts 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used un-
der conditions which require 
d) the person to wear an electronic monitonng 
device at all times, 
(11) that a device be placed in the home or other 
specified location of the person, so that the person's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored, 
and 
(m) the person to pay the costs of the electronic 
monitoring 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity de-
scribed m Subsection (13)(e) to place an electronic moni-
toring device on the person and install electronic moni-
tonng equipment m the residence of the person or other 
specified location 
(d) The court may 
d) require the person's electronic home monitonng 
device to include a substance abuse testing instru-
ment, 
(n) restnct the amount of alcohol the person may 
consume dunng the time the person is subject to 
home confinement, 
(ui) set specific time and location conditions that 
allow the person to attend school educational classes, 
or employment and to travel directly between those 
activities and the person's home, and 
dv) waive all or part of the costs associated with 
home confinement if the person is determined to be 
indigent by the court 
(e) The electronic monitonng descnbed in this section 
may either be administered directly bv the appropnate 
corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by 
contract with a pnvate provider 
(f) The electronic monitonng provider shall cover the 
costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv) 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Subsec-
tion (4)(e) or (5)(e) 
d) the court shall specify the period of the proba-
tion, 
(n) the person shall pay all of the costs of the 
probation, and 
(m) the court may order any other conditions of the 
probation 
(b) The court shall provide the probation descnbed in 
this section by contract with a probation monitonng 
agency or a pnvate probation provider 
(c) The probation provider descnbed in Subsection (b) 
shall monitor the person's compliance with all conditions 
of the persons sentence, condition of probation and 
court orders received under this article and shall notify 
the court of anv failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders 
(d) d) The court may waive all or part of the costs 
associated with probation if the person is determined 
to be indigent by the court 
(u) The probation provider descnbed m Subsection 
(14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the court 
under Subsection (14)(dXi) 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) 
and there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of 16 or higher, then if the court does not order 
(a) treatment as descnbed under Subsection (4Xd) 
(5Xd), or (6)(b)(ui), then the court shall enter the reasons 
on the record, and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the 
reasons on the record 
d) the installation of an ignition interlock system 
as a condition of probation for the person in accor-
dance with Section 41-6-44 7, or 
(n) the imposition of home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitonng in accordance with 
Subsection (13) 2000 
41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings 1987 
41-6-44.2. Repealed . 1983 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — 
Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including 
standards of training 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is matenal to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutonly 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event, and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation mdicate 
their trustworthiness 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary 1987 
41-6-44.4. Renumbered as § 53-3-231. 1996 
41-6-44.5. Admissibi l i ty of chemical test results in ac-
tions for driving under the influence — 
Weight of evidence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or cnminal action or proceeding in which 
it is matenal to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutonly prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test or tests as authonzed in Section 41-6-44 10 
are admissible as evidence 
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(h) U) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an 
individual or body of individuals designated by the 
agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to 
conduct an adjudicative proceeding 
(n) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an 
agency may substitute one presiding officer for an-
other during any proceeding 
(in) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one 
phase of a proceeding need not continue as presiding 
officer through all phases of a proceeding 
(1) "Respondent" means a person against whom an 
adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency 
or any other person 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or 
authorized by law to review the orders of another agency 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designat-
ing DV r u ^ e the names or titles of the agency head or the 
presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative proceed-
ings before the agency 1988 
63~46b-3. Commencement of adjudicat ive proceed-
ings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all 
adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by either 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are com-
menced by the agency, or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are 
commenced by persons other than the agency 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served 
according to the following requirements 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, 
signed by a presiding officer, and shall include 
d) the names and mailing addresses of all persons 
to whom notice is being given by the presiding officer, 
and the name, title, and mailing address of any 
attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency, 
(n) the agency's file number or other reference 
number, 
(in) the name of the adjudicative proceeding, 
Civ) the date that the notice of agency action was 
mailed, 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative pro-
ceeding is to be conducted informally according to the 
provisions of rules adopted under Sections 63-46b-4 
and 63-46D-5, or formally according to the provisions 
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll, 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a 
statement that each respondent must file a wnt ten 
response within 30 days of the mailing date of the 
notice of agency action, 
(vn) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, 
or if a hearing is required by statute or rule, a 
statement of the time and place of any scheduled 
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the 
hearing is to be held, and a statement that a party 
who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may 
be held in default, 
(vin) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be infor-
mal and a heanng is required by statute or rule, or if 
a heanng is permitted by rule and may be requested 
by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a 
statement that the parties may request a hearing 
within the time provided by the agency's rules, 
dx) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdic-
tion under which the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
maintained, 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone 
number of the presiding officer, and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicame 
proceeding and, to the extent known bv the prebiding 
officer, the questions to be decided 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by 
the agency, the agency shall 
(0 mail the notice of agency action to each party, 
(n) publish the notice of agency action, if required 
by statute, and 
(in) mail the notice of agency action to any other 
person who has a right to notice under s tatute or rule 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits 
persons other than the agency to initiate adjudicative 
proceedings, tha t person's request for agency action shall 
be in writing and signed by the person invoking the 
jurisdiction of the agency, or by that person's representa-
tive, and shall include 
d) the names and addresses of all persons to whom 
a copy of the request for agency action is being sent, 
(in) the agency's file number or other reference 
number, if known, 
(m) the date that the request for agency action was 
mailed, 
(iv) a statement of the legal authonty and jurisdic-
tion under which agency action is requested, 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from 
the agency, and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming 
the basis for relief or agency action 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the 
request with the agency and shall mail a copy to each 
person known to have a direct interest in the requested 
agency action 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms 
eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to 
serve as the request for agency action when completed 
and filed by the person requesting agency action 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a re-
quest for agency action and shall 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the 
request is granted and that the adjudicative proceed-
ing is completed, 
(u) notify the requesting party in writing that the 
request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal 
adjudicative proceeding, that the party may request a 
heanng before the agency to challenge the denial, or 
(m) notify the requesting party that further pro-
ceedings are required to determine the agency's re-
sponse to the request 
(e) d) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(n) shall 
contain the information required by Subsection 63-
46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Sub-
section (3)(dXn) 
(u) The agency shall mail any notice required by 
Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, except that any notice 
required by Subsection (3)(d)(m) may be published 
when publication is required by statute 
(ill; The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(m) 
shall 
(A) give the agency's file number or other 
reference number, 
(B) give the name of the proceeding, 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of 
a category to be conducted informally according 
to the provisions of rules enacted under Sections 
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
cable rule authonzing that designation, or for-
mally according to Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-
n 
> 
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(D) m the case of a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding, and where respondent parties are 
known, state that a written response must be 
filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's 
notice if mailed, or within 30 days of the last 
publication date of the agency's notice, if pub-
lished, 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be for-
mal, or if a hearing is to be held in an informal 
adjudicative proceeding, state the time and place 
of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which 
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who 
fails to attend or participate in a scheduled and 
noticed hearing may be held in default, 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be in-
formal, and a hearing is required by statute or 
rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may 
be requested by a party within the time pre-
scribed by rule, state the parties' right to request 
a heanng and the time within which a heanng 
may be requested under the agency's rules, and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and 
telephone number of the presiding officer 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not 
verned by this chapter, but agency and judicial review of 
ose initial determinations or actions are subject to the 
ovisions of this chapter, the request for agency action 
eking review must be filed with the agency within the time 
escribed by the agency's rules 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an 
ency may, by rule, provide for a longer response time than 
lowed by this section, and may provide for a shorter re-
onse time if required or permitted by applicable federal law 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, 
•plications for licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, 
lapters 3, Packaging Agencies, 4, Public Liquor License, and 
Private Club Liquor* License are not considered to be a 
quest for agency action under this chapter 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award 
license or other privilege as to which there are multiple 
mpetmg applicants, the agency may, by rule or order, 
nduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the 
vard of that license or privilege 2001 
*-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as 
informal — Standards — Undesignated pro-
ceedings formal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adju-
cative proceedings to be conducted informally according to 
le procedures set forth in rules enacted under the authonty 
this chapter if 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate 
any procedural requirement imposed by a statute other 
than this chapter, 
(b) in the view of the agency, the nghts of the parties to 
the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the infor-
mal procedures, 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administra-
tive efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations, and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings out-
weighs the potential benefits to the public of a formal 
adjudicative proceeding 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency 
djudicative proceedings not specifically designated as mfor-
lal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be conducted 
>rmally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudica-
mg, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adju-
dicative proceeding if 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public inter-
est, and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly 
prejudice the rights of any party 1987 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more 
categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudica-
tive proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, prescribe proce-
dures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the 
following 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires 
a response, no answer or other pleading responsive to the 
allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the 
request for agency action need be filed 
(b) The agency shall hold a heanng if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, or if a heanng is permitted by 
rule and is requested b> a party within the time pre-
scribed by rule 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of 
agency action or in the request for agency action shall be 
permitted to testify, present evidence, and comment on 
the issues 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all 
parties 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency mav issue 
subpoenas or other orders to compel production of neces-
sary evidence 
(f) All parties shall have access to information con-
tained in the agency's files and to all materials and 
information gathered in any investigation, to the extent 
permitted by law 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency 
may enact rules permitting intervention where a federal 
s tatute or rule requires that a state permit intervention 
(h) All heanngs shall be open to all parties 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the close of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer 
shall issue a signed order in writing that states the 
following 
(I) the decision, 
(II) the reasons for the decision, 
(III) a notice of any right of administrative or 
judicial review available to the parties, and 
(IV) the time limits for filing an appeal or request-
ing a review 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the 
facts appeanng in the agency's files and on the facts 
presented in evidence at any heanngs 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be 
promptly mailed to each of the parties 
(2) (a) The agency may record any heanng 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter 
approved by the agency prepare a transcript from the 
agency's record of the hearing 
(3) Nothing m this section restricts or precludes any inves-
tigative ngh t or power given to an agency by another statute. 
1988 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Responsive pleadings. , 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified 
by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, w 
any, shall file and serve a written response signed by tne 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number, 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding, 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks, 
(d) a statement of the facts, and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief 
requested should be granted 
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed 
under Subsection (1) to each party 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit 
or require pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action, 
the request for agency action, and the response All documents 
permitted or required to be filed shall be filed with the agency 
and one copy shall be sent to each party 2001 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Discovery and subpoenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agrency may, by 
rule, prescnbe means of discovery adequate to permit the 
parties to obtain all relevant information necessairy to support 
their claims or defenses If the agency does not enact rules 
under this section, the parties may conduct discovery accord-
ing to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of 
witnesses or the production of evidence in formal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer when 
requested by any party, or may be issued by the presiding 
officer on his own motion 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any inves-
tigative ngh t or power given to an agency by another statute 
1987 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicati ve proceed-
ings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (11), 
in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be 
conducted as follows 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the 
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to 
afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present 
their positions 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the 
presiding officer 
(I) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, imma-
terial, or unduly repetitious, 
(II) shall exclude evidence privileged m the courts 
of Utah, 
(III) may receive documentary evidence in the form 
of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all 
pertinent portions of the original document, 
dv) may take official notice of any facts that could 
be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, of the record of other proceedings before the 
agency, and of technical or scientific facte within the 
agency's specialized knowledge 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence 
solely because it is hearsay 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the 
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct 
cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to 
the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present 
oral or written statements at the heanng 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as 
evidence to be considered in reaching a decision on the 
ments , shall be given under oath 
(g) The heanng shall be recorded at the agency's ex-
pense 
approved Dy the agency prepare a transcript of the hear 
ing, subject to any restrictions that the agenc\ is permit 
ted by statute to impose to protect confidential inform a 
tion disclosed at the heanng 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from 
taking appropnate measures necessary to preserve the integ 
n ty of the hearing i9«8 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, wntten 
petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding with 
the agency The person who wishes to intervene shall mail a 
copy of the petition to each party The petition shall include 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference numbei 
(b) the name of the proceeding, 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the peti 
tioner's legal nghts or interests are substantially affected 
by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the peti-
tioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of 
law, and 
(d) a s tatement of the relief that the petitioner seek > 
from the agency 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for interven 
tion if the presiding officer determines that 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantialh 
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt 
conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will not be mate 
n a i l / impaired by allowing the intervention 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to inter 
vene shall be in writmg and mailed to the petitioner and 
each party 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose con-
ditions on the intervenor's participation in the adjudica-
tive proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at 
any time after the intervention 2001 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the heanng, or after 
the filing of any posthearing documents permitted by the 
presiding officer, or within the time required by an\ 
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer s findings 01 
fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the 
adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclu 
sions of law, 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding 
officer's decision, 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agenc\ 
(e) a notice of the ngh t to apply for reconsidera 
tion, 
(f) a notice of any ngh t to administrative or judi 
cial review of the order available to aggneved parties 
and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsidera 
tion or review 
(2) The presiding officer may use the presiding officer s 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowl-
edge to evaluate the evidence 
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be 
based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is 
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence 
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(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer 
rom issuing interim orders to 
(a) notify the parties of further heanngs, 
(b) notify the par t ies of provisional rul ings on a 
portion of the issues presented, or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient con-
duct of the adjudicative proceeding 2001 
3b-ll. Default 
The presiding officer may en te r an order of default 
1st a par t} if 
(a) a part} in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails 
to part ic ipate in the adjudicative proceeding, 
(b) a par ty to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to 
a t t end or part icipate in a properly scheduled hear ing 
after receiving proper notice, or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to file a response under Section 63-46b-6 
) An order of default shall include a s t a t emen t of the 
mds for default and shall be mailed to all par t ies 
) (a) A defaulted par ty may seek to have the agency set 
aside the default order, and any order in the adjudicative 
proceeding issued subsequent to t he default order, by 
following the procedures outl ined in the U tah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent 
order shall be made to the presiding officer 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under 
Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-
46b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer on the 
motion to set aside the default 
4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, 
or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party tha t has 
other parties besides the party in default, the presiding 
officer shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any 
further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the party in 
default and shall determine all issues in the adjudicative 
proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties 
other than the agency and the party in default, the 
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, 
dismiss the proceeding 1988 
*-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to 
any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by 
the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party 
may file a wntten request for review within 30 days after 
the issuance of the order with the person or entity 
designated for that purpose by the statute or rule 
(b) The request shall 
(I) be signed by the par ty seeking review, 
(II) s ta te the grounds for review and the relief 
requested, 
(in) s ta te the date upon which it was mailed, and 
dv) be mailed to t he presiding officer and to each 
par ty 
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mai l ing da t e of the reques t for 
review, or within the t ime period provided by agency rule, 
whichever is longer, any pa r ty may file a response with 
the person designated by s t a t u t e or rule to receive the 
response 
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection 
(2)(a) shall mail a copy of the response to each of the 
par t ies and to the presiding officer 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an 
order by the agenc> or a superior agency, the agency or 
supenor agenc> shall review the order within a reasonable 
time or withm the time required b> statute or the agenc\ s 
rules 
(4) To assis t in review, the agency or superior agencj ma> 
by order or rule permi t the par t ies to file briefs or other 
documents , or to conduct oral a rgumen t 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all 
parties 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable t ime after the filing of any 
response, other filings, or oral a rgument , or within the 
t ime required by s t a t u t e or applicable rules , the agency or 
superior agency shal l issue a wri t ten order on review 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency 
head or by a person designated by the agency for that 
purpose and shal l be mailed to each par ty 
(c) The order on review shall contain 
(I) a designation of the statute or rule permitting 
or requiring review, 
(II) a statement of the issues reviewed, 
(III) findings of fact as to each of the issues re-
viewed, 
(IV) conclusions of law as to each of the issues 
reviewed, 
(v) the reasons for the disposition, 
(vi) whe the r the decision of the presiding officer or 
agencv is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and 
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative pro-
ceeding is to be remanded , 
(vn) a notice of any r ight of further administrat ive 
reconsideration or judicial review available to ag-
grieved par t ies , and 
(vm) the t ime limits applicable to any appeal or 
review 2001 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the da te t h a t an order is issued 
for which review by the agency or by a s u p e n o r agency 
under Section 63-46b-12 is unavai lable , and if the order 
would otherwise const i tute final agency action, any party 
ma> file a w n t t e n reques t for reconsideration with the 
agency, s ta t ing the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by s t a tu t e , the filing of 
the request is not a prerequis i te for seeking judicial 
review of the order 
(2) The request for reconsiderat ion shal l be filed with the 
agency and one copy shall be mailed to each par ty by the 
person making the reques t 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that 
purpose, shall issue a wntten order granting the request 
or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that 
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the 
filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall 
be considered to be denied 2001 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. 
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is 
expressly prohibited by statute 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting 
all administrative remedies available, except that 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other 
statute states that exhaustion is not required, * 
(b) the court may relieve a par ty seeking judicial re* 
view of the requi rement to exhaus t any or all administra-
tive remedies if * 
(1) the adminis t ra t ive remedies a re inadequate, 0 
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(u) exhaustion of remedies would result in irrepa-
rable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion 
(3) (a) A par ty shall file a petition for judicial review of final 
agency action within 30 days after the date tha t the order 
consti tuting the final agency action is issued or is consid-
ered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b) 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate part ies as respondents and shall meet the 
form requirements specified in this chapter 1988 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings, except tha t the juve-
nile courts have jurisdiction over all s tate agency actions 
relat ing to 
d) the removal or placement of children in s ta te 
custody, 
(u) the support of children under Subsection 
(D(aXi) as determined administratively under Sec-
tion 78-3a-906, and 
(in) substant ia ted findings of abuse or neglect 
made by the Division of Child and Family Services, 
after an evidentiary hearing 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be as provided in the s ta tu te governing 
the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, in 
the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the 
petitioner's principal place of business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudi-
cative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include 
d) the name and mailing address of the party 
seeking judicial review, 
(n) the name and mailing address of the respon-
dent agency, 
(m) the title and date of the final agency action to 
be reviewed, together with a copy, summary, or brief 
descnption of the agency action, 
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties 
in the informal adjudicative proceedings tha t led to 
the agency action, 
(v) a copy of the writ ten agency order from the 
informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrat ing tha t the p a r t / seeking 
judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review, 
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the type and 
extent of relief requested, and 
(vin) a s ta tement of the reasons why the petitioner 
is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedmgs in the 
district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all 
questions of fact and law and any constitutional issue 
presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial pro-
ceedings under this section 2001 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal ad jud ica t ive pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by s ta tute , the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action result-
ing from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required b\ t h a 
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate 
court shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in 
the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agencv *, 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings 
are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except 
that 
(a) all par t ies to the review proceedings may stipulate 
to shorten, summarize, or organize the record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing 
t ranscr ip ts and copies for the record 
(I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to 
st ipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, or 
(II) according to any other provision of law 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines tha t a person seeking 
judicial review h a s been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following 
(a) the agency action, or the s ta tu te or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face 
or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction con-
ferred by any s ta tute , 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requir-
ing resolution, 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure, 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, tha t is not supported 
by substant ia l evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court, 
(h) the agency action is 
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute , 
(II) contrary to a rule of the agency, 
(III) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless 
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts 
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency, or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 1988 
63-46b-17. J u d i c i a l r ev iew — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings by the dis tnct court or the review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court 
may award damages or compensation only to the extent 
expressly authorized by s ta tute 
(b) In grant ing relief, the court may 
(I) order agency action required by law, 
(II) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law, 
(in) set aside or modify agency action, 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agenc> 
action, or 
(v) remand the mat te r to the agency for further 
proceedings 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency 
action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by 
statute 1987 
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6b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other tempo-
rary remedies pending final disposition. 
) Unless precluded by another statute, the agenc> may 
it a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the 
iency of judicial review, according to the agency's rules 
) Parties shall petition the agenc> for a stay or other 
porary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances re-
e immediate judicial intervention 
) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary 
edies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial 
[1 be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why 
stay or other temporary remedy was not granted 
) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary 
edy to protect the public health, safet>, or welfare against 
lbstantial threat, the court ma> not grant a stay or other 
porary remedy unless it finds that 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the 
stay, or 
(b) (1) the party seeking judicial review is likely to 
prevail on the merits when the court finally disposes 
of the matter, 
(n) the party seeking judicial review will suffer 
irreparable injury without immediate relief, 
(in) granting relief to the party seekmg review will 
not substantially harm other parties to the proceed-
ings, and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare relied upon by the agency is not sufficiently 
senous to justify the agency's action under the cir-
cumstances 1987 
46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an 
agency may seek enforcement of an order by seeking civil 
enforcement in the district courts 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's 
order must name, as defendants, each alleged violator 
against whom the agency seeks to obtain civil enforce-
ment 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order shall be determined by the requirements of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, 
any of the following 
d) declaratory relief, 
(n) temporary or permanent injunctive relief, 
(m) any other civil remedy provided by law, or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing 
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or 
threatened by the failure of an agency to enforce an 
agency's order may timely file a complaint seeking civil 
enforcement of that order, but the action may not be 
commenced 
d) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has 
given notice of his intent to seek civil enforcement of 
the alleged violation to the agency head, the attorney 
general, and to each alleged violator against whom 
the petitioner seeks civil enforcement, 
(n) if the agency has filed and is diligently pros-
ecuting a complaint seeking civil enforcement of the 
same order against the same or a similarly situated 
defendant, or 
(m) if a petition for judicial review of the same 
order has been filed and is pending in court 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agen-
cy's order must name, as defendants, the agency whose 
order is sought to be enforced, the agency that is vested 
with the power to enforce the order, and each alleged 
violator against whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforce-
ment 
(c) Except to the extent expressl} authonzed b\ stat-
ute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agencv's 
order ma\ not request, and the court ma\ not grant anv 
monetary payment apart from taxable costs 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agenc>'s 
order, in addition to any other defenses allowed by law, a 
defendant ma> defend on the ground that 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an 
agency without jurisdiction to issue the order, 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant, 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order, or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subse-
quently complied 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order are reviewable in the same manner as other 
civil cases 1987 
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceedings . 
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis 
without complying with the requirements of this chapter if 
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the 
agency show that an immediate and significant danger to 
the public health, safety, or welfare exists, and 
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency 
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall 
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary 
to prevent or avoid the danger to the public health, safety, 
or welfare, 
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immedi-
ately, that includes a bnef statement of findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and reasons for the agency's utilization 
of emergency adjudicative proceedings, and 
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are re-
quired to comply with the order 
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will 
result in the continued infringement or impairment of any 
legal right or interest of any party, the agency shall commence 
a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other 
provisions of this chapter 1987 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, request-
ing that the agency issue a declaratory order determining the 
applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the primary 
jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances 
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that 
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions 
for declaratory orders, 
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions, 
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the 
agency will not issue a declaratory order, 
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the 
general policy of this chapter, and 
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable 
advice 
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if 
d) the request is one of a class of circumstances 
that the agency has by rule defined as being exempt 
from declaratory orders, or 
(n) the person requesting the declaratory order 
participated in an adjudicative proceeding concerning 
the same issue within 12 months of the date of the 
present request 
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would 
substantially prejudice the nghts of a person who would 
be a necessary party, only if that person consents in 
writing to the determination of the matter by a declara-
tory proceeding 
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if 
1 
R708-14-6. Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(1) In accordance with Subsection 63-46b-3(l), alcohol/drug adjudicative proceedings may 
be commenced by: 
(a) a notice of division action, if the proceedings are commenced by the division; or 
(b) a request for division action, if the proceedings are commenced by a person other than 
the division. 
(2) A notice of division action and request for division action shall include the information 
set forth in Subsections 63-46b-3(2)(a) and (3)(a) respectively. In addition, a request for division 
action shall include the petitioner's full name, date of birth, and the date of arrest or occurrence 
which prompted the request for division action. A request for division action that is not made 
timely, in accordance with Subsections 53-3-223(6)(a), 53-3-23l(7)(a)(ii), and 53-3-418(9)(b), 
will not be granted except for good cause as determined by the division. 
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HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing in the 
matter of Michael Hess versus G. Barton Blackstock, the 
Driver's License Division. And the Petitioner is present and 
represented by Mr. Oliver. The Respondent is present and 
represented by Ms. Waldron. 
Is the Driver's License Division ready to proceed, 
Ms. Waldron? 
MS. WALDRON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may call your first witness. 
MS. WALDRON: Your Honor, I believe counsel has 
basically a legal issue that he wants to argue regarding this 
case, regarding the initiation of the administrative 
proceedings and he will, we're going to stipulate to the fact 
that the officer served the petitioner a copy of the summons 
and citation which I'd like to be marked as Exhibit 1 and 
that's how the Driver's License Division initiated this 
proceedings, and depending on the outcome of his argument, 
Counsel will stipulate to the PC to arrest, admonitions were 
read and the results of the breath test which was a .23. So 
he's stipulating to all the factual basis needed other than 
this legal issue of what's the correct way to initiate these 
driver's license proceedings. 
MR. OLIVER: We lust have a brief argument on that if 
that's okay with the Court. 
THE COURT: You may. Is that the agreement then Mr. 
Oliver? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So basically you are stipulating to all 
the factual basis necessary to justify the revocation with the 
exception of the manner in which it was initiated, is that your 
stipulation? 
I MR. OLIVER: Yes. That's our -
! THE COURT: The legal question before the Court is 
| the propriety of the initiation of the proceedings; is that 
1
 correct? 
I MR. OLIVER: That's correct. 
MS. WALDRON: Exactly. 
! THE COURT: All right. You may speak to that then. 
I MS. WALDRON: I will have to respond after counsel < 
• makes his argument but it's our position that the case law and 
| the statutes requires that the initiation of these driver's | 
| license proceedings is the service by the officer on the | 
I petitioner, a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation, the bottom | 
of which give the individual the notice of the Driver's License I 
I 
intent to deny, suspend or revoke or disqualify. It would also | 
list the individual's right to a hearing. He can request a I 
hearing within ten days and the procedure to go about getting | 
I 2 I 
1 the hearing, we're relying on, number one, 53-3-223 that 
2 basically explains that once an individual is arrested, the 
3 ! officer shall serve a notice on behalf of the division and sub-
4 section three lists what needs to be in that notice and would i 
5 I you go further down 223, it further goes on about upon a | 
1
 ! 
6 ! written request Division shall grant a person an opportunity to' 
7 | be heard within 29 days and kind of goes down and explains what ' 
8 I needs to be in the hearing. 
I 
9 | Additionally, the case of Mavis vs Blackstock, which I 
10 ' is a 1999 case, 94 P Second 1272, which I do have a copy of it | 
11 for Your Honor, states that this case was regarding what was 
12 | initiating event for these Driver's License hearings and they 
i i 
13 | ruled that it is the service of the notice of intent to ' 
I ' 
i i 
14 | suspend, revoke, or disqualify. Specifically, it says that the I 
15 i Driver's License Division must show that this notice was i 
16 ' served. l 
i 
17 | Counsel is pulling up the Administrative Procedures | 
t 
18 Act. I don't know exactly what section, and is claiming that | 
i i 
19 ' this notice does not contain what's necessary to start an j 
i 
20 | informal administrative procedure. Without being more specific] 
21 to those sections, since I don't have the book in front of me I 
22 and he just informed me of what his argument was, that since 
23 53-3-223 is specific on what is required to start these | 
I 
24 hearings, to start the administrative process and the fact that| 
I 
25 we have Mavis vs Blackstock interpreting what is required that I 
! 3 I 
1 whatever the difference is, the 53-3-223 and Mavis vs 
2 i Blackstock is controlling. I'll do further argument after I 
3 I hear from counsel. 
4 I THE COURT: Mr. Oliver? 
i 
5 I MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, just one thing that I wish 
6 I to clear up by way of setting our facts down. In our Petition 
7 for Judicial Review, we refer to this particular issue, at 
8 I least, let's see one, two, three, four, four times in our 
9 I petition. We refer to it once in Paragraph 12 of the petition, 
i 
i 
10 | once in Paragraph 18, once in Paragraph 19, once in Paragraph 
11 I 20 and so in those four paragraphs, actually and there's also 
i 
12 I Paragraph 32 refers to it and so, we actually refer to this 
i 
13 | particular provision at least five times in our petition. So 
i 
14 I it's not like this is something I'm raising the first time 
i 
15 , today. This is actually one of our causes of action that we 
16 , have pled before this Court. 
17 | It's our position that in the code book, 41-6-44.1, 
18 I now 41-6-44 is the DUI section in Utah Code. 41-6-44.1 is the 
19 I procedures for adjudicative proceedings. This driver's license 
20 | hearing is an adjudicative proceedings, but the procedures 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
state in 41-6-44.1 says "The Department of Public Safety shall 
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63 Chapter 
4 6B in it's adjudicative proceedings." Then when we take a 
look and we see what 63-46B refers to, what it refers to, Your 
Honor, is, we'll start off with Paragraph 3 as we have pled in 
4 
i our petition. It says, "Commencement of adjudicative 
2 proceedings'' and it says, "except as otherwise permitted m 63-
3 46-B20" and that's emergency procedures and there's some very 
4 I specific things that have to happen and be shown for that 
5 i exception to take place. The Court can refer to that. I have 
6 I not problem with that. "All adjudicative proceedings shall be 
7 | commenced by either" and it gives you two alternatives, "Notice 
of agency action if proceedings are commenced by the agency, or 
a request for agency action if proceedings are commenced by 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
persons other than the agency." So we have two ways to begin I 
an administrative proceeding with the agency. One is that the 
agency begins it and it's the agency that initiating it and the I 
I 
other is a request from a third person requesting the agency to 
take action. 
Now, then it goes on to state in Sub-Paragraph 2, it 
says, "A notice of agency action shall be filed and served ' 
17 I according to the following requirements." Shall mandatory. , 
i 
i 
18 t "The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a 
19 j presiding officer." Well, Exhibit 1 has not been moved or 
20 I admitted but I think the stipulation is that it will be because 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
we're indicating procedures (inaudible) accordingly. I'd move 
to admit Exhibit 1. 
MS. WALDRON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Is that Exhibit 1? 
MR. OLIVER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. One is received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 received) 
MR. OLIVER: Exhibit 1, if the Court will review 
that, at no place is it signed by a presiding officer and then 
it says, "and shall include the names and mailing addresses of 
all persons to whom the notice is being given by the presiding 
officer and the name, title, and mailing address of any 
attorney or employee who has been designated to appear for the 
agency." We have the name of the individual arrested but we 
have nothing else and again, it's not being mailed by the 
presiding officer. "Agency's file number or other reference 
number." That may or may not be there if we consider the 
driver's licence number to be the file or reference number, so 
be it. I'm not sure that's crucial,. The name of the 
adjudicative proceeding, that is not there. The date that the 
notice of agency action was mailed. It wasn't mailed. 
Statement of whether the adjudicative proceedings is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of the rule 
adopted under 63-46B4 and 63-46B5 or formally according to the 
provisions of section 63-46B6 to 63-46B11. That's not there. 
It's not indicating whether it's going to be informal or formal 
and that's a requirement. "If the adjudicative proceedings is 
be formal," it is not so we'll move on from that. "If the 
adjudicative proceedings to be" again, that's formal. We'll 
not worry about that one. That's 6 and 7 of the sub-section 
there. "If the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a 
hearing is required by statute or rule or if a hearing is 
permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within a time 
prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a 
hearing within the time provided by the agency's rules." One 
could argue that that provision is there except that this is | 
not being an initiated by the agency, this is rather being 
initiated on a citation by the officer who is not an employee l 
of the agency. "Statement of the legal authority and j 
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
maintained." The name and title. "The name, title, mailing 
address and telephone number of the presiding officer." That's1 
not there. "A statement of the purpose of the adjudicative ' 
proceeding and to the extent known by the presiding officer, i 
the questions to be decided." One could argue that the purpose 
of the proceeding is contained there but not the questions to | 
be decided. Okay? And then it goes on to state, "When j 
adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the | 
agency shall" - I 
THE COURT: Mr. Oliver, look, the whole issue is | 
i 
whether or not this is an emergency proceeding or not isn't it?j 
i 
MR. OLIVER: No. I 
THE COURT: Isn't that the whole issue before the I 
matter that allows him to short circuit the procedure — 
MR. OLIVER: I'll go to that and I'll read the 20 | 
i 
i 
7 ! 
1 because — 
2 THE COURT: Yeah, I think that's the issue. The 
3 question is if it isn't and they're required to go the route 
4 designated by the Administrative Procedures Act, it certainly 
5 doesn't qualify. 
6 MR. OLIVER: And then I'll go onto 20 and I'll 
7 address Section 20 which is the Emergency Adjudicative 
8 Proceedings which it does not comply with this either. "An 
9 agency may issue an order" now, this is the agency issuing an 
10 order not commencing an action; but it says, "An agency may 
11 issue an order on an emergency basis without complying with the 
12 requirements of this chapter if (a) the facts known by the 
13 agency..." When this citation is issued, there's no facts 
14 I known by the agency at that time. "Or presented to the agency 
15 show then an immediate and significant danger to the public 
16 health, safety or welfare exists." One could argue that if one 
17 is under the influence of alcohol that they present a danger to 
18 the public health or safety. I understand that, but in this 
19 particular case, the problem that we have is the notice comes 
20 i and it doesn't take emergency action by the agency. What it 
21 ' does is it says, you're granted a temporary license for up to 
22 i 30 days. 
23 I THE COURT: But isn't the emergency action the taking 
I 
24 I of his regular driving privileges? 
25 I MR. OLIVER: No, because then the hearing is held at 
8 
his request. But I'll move on — 
THE COURT: But doesn't the action of the officer, 
deprive him or his regular driving privilege? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE COURT: And he has a right within 30 days to a 
hearing or it's going to be for 90 days. 
MR. OLIVER: Or a year, whatever the case may be. 
THE COURT: Or a year or whatever. 
MR. OLIVER: But, no, it doesn't deprive him of that 
because he's still allowed his regular driving, as a matter of 
fact that night — 
THE COURT: Well, but-
MR. OLIVER: The night that he's arrested -
THE COURT: - the point is, not that. The point is 
regular driving privileges are gone unless he takes an appeal 
within 30 days and they find that it's not appropriate. Isn't 
that right? Isn't that what happens? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE COURT: They're essentially depriving him of his 
driving privileges, aren't they? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE COURT: Sure they are. 
MR. OLIVER: No. As a matter of fact, if the 
citation is not sent to the department — 
THE COURT: I realize there's procedures to follow 
but I'm saying if they follow the procedures, his license is 
gone. His regular driving privileges are gone after 30 days; 
isn't that right? 
MR. OLIVER: Well, that's assuming that the facts are 
there to substantiate it. 
THE COURT: Well, sure it's assuming that. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. 
THE COURT: But I'm saying, they're taking some 
emergency action. They're saying Mr. Oliver, you can drive for 
30 days, but your regular driver's license is gone unless you 
in fact, make an application within 30 days and we decide 
something else. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. Let me go on and finish reading 
the provisions. Okay. "The threat requires immediate action 
by the agency." Okay, now, I think that if we're going to 
argue that indeed the agency is using the emergency procedures, 
if that's what we're going to argue, then my position would be 
that the threat is then and there at that time, not 30 days 
hence. That indeed the driver should be taken off the road 
immediately and not allowed to return to the road but indeed 
what we say is no, we're going to take you off the road now. 
But even right now, I'm arresting you for DUI, but even right 
now, you still have the right to drive. 
THE COURT: It's not an emergency, you can drive for 
another 30 days. 
10 
1 MR. OLIVER: That's correct, yes. 
2 , But it goes on, "In issuing its emergency order, the 
3 agency shall" which they didn't issue this, "In issuing its 
4 emergency order, the agency shall limit its order to require 
5 only the action necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to 
6 i public health, safety, or welfare." That's not what they're 
7 doing. They're not saying don't drive while you've been 
8 drinking which would be the emergency that the Court is 
9 - referring to. What they're saying is you're not going to be 
10 ' able to drive at all and that doesn't address the emergency. 
11 i It addresses a punishment or a sanction. I'm not trying to use 
12 I the wrong word and please, let's not get hung up on double 
13 , jeopardy. I'm not going there. That has nothing to do with 
14 i this case so if I use a word that the Court feels uncomfortable 
15 with, that's not what I'm after. 
16 ' THE COURT: I'm not concerned with that. 
17 MR. OLIVER: And I apologize in advance because this 
18 i has nothing to do with the other side of the case, Your Honor. 
19 ' Not even remotely. 
20 | So, what they're doing is they're saying under any 
! 
21 I circumstances you can't drive. They're not just limiting it to 
i 
22 I the emergency or to the danger or to the public safety. 
23 
24 
They're just saying no, this is a sanction that we're placing 
on you and that's where it sits. Okay. So that's violated. 
25 J Then B, "Issue promptly a written order effective immediately' 
11 
1 right then, "that includes a brief statement of findings of 
2 fact, conclusions of law and reasons for the agency's 
3 utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings." Never 
4 ' done. There's nothing in anything that Mr. Hess has received 
5 | from the Driver's License Division that even comes close to 
i 
6 | that or even a suggestion that the agency is using it's 
7 I emergency proceedings power. "Give immediate notice to the 
8 i persons who are required to comply with the order. If the 
9 I emergency order issued under this section will result in a 
10 continued infringement or impairment or any legal right or 
11 i interest or any party, the agency shall commence a formal 
12 | adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other provisions 
! 
I 
13 ! of this chapter." They don't. They have informal proceedings, 
14 I not formal. So that provision is not even complied with by the 
15 | department. 
i 
i 
16 • So if we look at it under 20, I was not summarily 
17 | brushing 20 aside; but if we look at it under 20, they still 
18 ! haven't complied with that. They don't even come close to it. 
19 I They don't even make an effort to make it look it like they're 
20 { complying under 20. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
And so overall, all the way from a formal 
adjudicative proceedings, an informal adjudicative proceedings 
but the requirement is that they comply with 63-46B, you walk 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and that's what has 
to happen. They didn't do it and so we've pled it. This does 
1 not come as a surprise to counsel. We've pled it. We've pled 
2 it very plainly and very clearly and it's our position that the 
3 I agency action was commenced inappropriately, not according to ! 
4 i statute, not according to authority. And the case cited by the | 
5 ! State, I appreciate that, that wasn't the question. The | 
i 
6 question that is here and whether or not they followed the \ 
7 : adjudicative proceedings as outlined in 63-46B, which is | 
8 i required to be followed under the DUI statute, if indeed - and 
9 | that wasn't the issue that was raised in that case. We're 
10 ! raising very specific issues and we're saying no, if you're 
11 i going to commence an agency action, we'll say there's one of 
12 I three. You either begin it under the emergency procedures 
13 | which they did not do. They didn't have a formal adjudicative 
14 | proceeding in this matter; or the agency has to commence it and 
15 | there's specific requirements; or it has to be at the request 
16 • of a third party and then again, the statute defines what is 
17 i required when there's a request for agency action by a third 
18 i person. We actually believe, though I can't speak for the 
19 ! agency, we actually believe that's the method under which 
20 i they're commencing the action and that's contained within 
i 
21 J 63-46B3. The provision is there for when the adjudicative 
22 I proceedings are to be commenced by a person other than the 
23 | agency, and they're not complied with either. 
24 I So it's our position that whether it's the agency 
25 commencing it, somebody else requesting agency action or the 
i 
i 1 3 
emergency powers, at no point has the agency complied with 
their requirements to begin the administrative proceedings. 
Therefore, we believe that the administrative proceedings were 
commenced inappropriately and we would ask this Court to set 
the agency's action aside. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Waldron, would you like to respond? 
MS. WALDRON: Just briefly. Where counsel was 
reading regarding the requirements of the mailing address of 
the individual you're mailing it to and all that, does not 
apply here since the requirement is the individual gets 
personally served by the police officer which is - the 
requirements of the mailing and all the address is to verify 
that they were mailed to the correct address and to show 
service. In this case, it's personal service and it's usually 
shown by the testimony of the police officers. 
And also, Your Honor, the statute that counsel was 
reading, not only covered the commencement but regarding what's 
required at the hearing. What was the section again? 
THE COURT: 63-46B, Sub-Section 3. 
MS. WALDRON: I mean, here, the notice is in writing 
and according to - it's not signed by the presiding officer 
because the Driver's License Division, pursuant to statute, has 
given their okay for the police officers to personally serve 
the notice of intent on their behalf which is also stated in 
1 
Mavis as the correct procedure to do. 
All these other items that counsel has - the agency's 
file number, etc., etc., I don't think that since the Driver's 
License Division has a specific statute, 53-3-23 that lists out 
the requirements to initiate the suspension - the driver's 
license suspension is for the public safety. It might not come 
under the Emergency Revocation Act where there's a separate 
action for that where you can revoke someone's license without 
a hearing. In this case, even in Mavis, it says that in 
analyzing these driver's license proceedings, it says "The 
purpose of the entire drunken driving statutory scheme is to 
expeditiously remove drunken drivers from Utah's roads, thus 
time is of the essence in the statutory scheme when considered 
as a whole and substantial rights could depend on the 
compliance with the requirement," which they're talking about 
the service of the immediate notice and the basic information. 
No where has there been a case stating that 53-3-23 is not 
appropriate when it's compared to the Administrative Procedures 
Act and it is our position that we've complied with 53-3-223 
and have initiated the action with the service of the notice 
and intent to suspend or revoke, and I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Oliver? 
MR. OLIVER: Nothing further. I'd just refresh the 
Court's recollection that 41-6-44, indicates that the 
administrative and adjudicative proceedings are to be followed 
15 
under the Administrative Procedure Act and that's what it says. 
It states specifically, 63-46B, the requirement is there. We , 
believe that that creates a due process position. | 
THE COURT: The Court will take the matter under i 
advisement. I would like a copy of that Mavis case if you have, 
that there. j 
MS. WALDRON: You can have my copy, Your Honor. | 
THE COURT: Do either of you have any desire to I 
submit any memorandums on it or do you just want me to take a | 
look at your arguments and rule from there? ' 
MR. OLIVER: I'd be happy to submit one if the Court I 
desires. If not I'll just leave it to the Court. 
THE COURT: Ms. Waldron, what's your desire? 
MS. WALDRON: Leave it to the Court, Your Honor. I ! 
think all the statues are there. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll review what your 
arguments are and I'll make a ruling and notify you m writing. 
MS. WALDRON: Thank you very much, Your Honor. i 
THE COURT: Thank you for appearing. j 
I 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) | 
i 
i 
(C) 
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CERTIFICATE 
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in the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Rodney | 
i 
S. Page was transcribed by me from a videotape and i 
! 
is a full, true, and correct transcription of the i 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best I 
of my ability. 
i 
Signed this 28tn day of December, 2001 in | 
Sandy, Utah. I 
Carolyn Erickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
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(REFUSAL TO SUBMIT UNDER 41-6-44 10 UCA) fflfflteZ foreighteen (18) months for a first refusal to submit to a chemical test or for twenty-four (24) months if it is a 
second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or drug related dnving offense 
(COMMERCIAL DISQUALIFICATION53-3-418 UCA) disqualified, for dnving a commercial vehicle, pursuant to 53-3-414 UCA for one (1) year for a first offense 
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in opportunity for a civil administrative heanng, upon receiving a written request within 10 calendar days of arrest Send request to Dnver License Division, PO Box 30560, 
-ake City, Utah 84130-0560 (attn DUI Section) Failure to properly request a heanng or to appear for a heanng, may result in loss of dnving privilege A criminal conviction cf 
from court) or an adverse administrative determination (from Dnver License Division) will result in loss of dnving pnvilege 
is VALID 
RATOR 
I—I NOT VALID \-¥\ as a temporary license for up to thirty (36) days from the date of this notice 
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REBECCA D. WALDRON (6148) 
Assistant Attorney General • 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O.BoxK0857 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL C W. HESS, FINDINGS OF .PACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau Case No. 010700131 AA 
Chief, DAVID A. BEACH, Director, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, Judge Rodney S. Page 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled maner came before the Court for a trial dc novo on May 8,2001, the 
Honorable Rodney S.fage presiding. The Petitioner and his counsel, D. Bruce Oliver appeared. 
Respondent appeared through counsel Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The 
Parties stipulated that the Plaintiff was served with a copy of the citation at the time of arrest 
along with a notice of Division's intent to revoke his driver's license and information on his right 
FILED 
SE? • 5 2001 
'"' ' SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
to a hearing before the revocation becomes effective. Parties further stipulated that the only issue 
before the Court was whether the procedure authorized by Sectiorv 53-3-223 UCA, (1953, as 
amended) violated Administrative Procedures Act and denied Plaintiff due process. The Court, 
having heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and arguments presented at 
the hearing, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 27, 2001, Petitioner was arrested for violation section 41-6-44 UCA 
(1953, as amended). 
2 The arresting officer served Petitioner with a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation 
which included the Driver License Division's notice of their intent to suspend or revoke 
Petitioner's driving privilege and his right to a hearing before the revocation becomes effective: 
3. Petitioner's license was suspended for one year effective February 26, 2001 based on a 
second or subsequent driving under the influence arrest. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
L Section 53-3-223 of the Driver's License Act allows an officer to confiscate the 
driver's license of one suspected for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs The section 
allows the officer to issue the suspect a temporary license good for 30 days and 10 give the 
suspect notice that his driver's license will be suspended beginning 30 days from the date of the 
*> 
citation providing information on his right to a hearing before the revocation period starts. 
2: The Administrative Procedures Act sets up regulations governing procedures that 
must be followed prior to an agency taking certain action. Section 63-46(b)-0.5 et seq. UCA 
(1953. as amended). 
3. Section 63-46(b)-3 sets forth how agency adjudicative procedures must be followed. 
Section exempts those kinds of administrative procedures that are permitted pursuant to Section 
63«46(b>20oftheact. 
4. Section 63-46(b)-20 provides for emergency adjudicative proceedings and states that 
an agency may issue an order without complying with the requirements of the chapter if the facts 
known by the agency or presented to the agency show that an immediate and significant danger 
to the public health, safety or welfare exists and that the threat requires immediate action by the 
agency. It also provides for certain limitations on any order issued by the agency in those 
circumstances. 
5. The procedures set up by Section 53-3-223 are designed to limit the driving privileges 
of those suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and to remove them from 
the highway as quickly as possible without waiting for the regular judicial process. There is an 
immediate danger posed to the public and society by those who drive while impaired by drugs or 
alcohol. 
6. The Court concludes that the procedures set up by Section 53-3-223 are in the nature 
3 
AW ?/ 
cf emergency actions and are therefore exempt form the requirements of 63-46(b)o. The 
procedures comply with the requirements of 63-46(b>20(2) in that notice and citation provides 
facts and statements sufficient to provided the basis for using the emergency procedures and it is 
signed by the police officer. It provides notice to the defendant and an opportunity for heanng 
before the effective date of the revocation 
7 Tae procedures set forth in Section 53-3-223 UCA (1953, as amended) do not violate 
the Administrative Procedures Act and do not infringe on Plaintiffs rights of due process 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREY ORDERED-
1. Petitioner's Petition seeking the return of his license is denied. 
2. The February 20, 2001, suspension of Petitioner's driving privilege for a period one 
year effective Februaiy 26,2001 is affirmed. 
Dated this 2Z_ day of Ay^
 t 2001. 
BY THE COURT. 
Honorable i^ ocjney S Page 
District Court Judge 
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